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Abstract: This study reviews the impact of the Spanish Transparency Law (TL) 19/2013 and the
Union of European Football Associations’ (UEFA) Financial Fair Play (FFP) regulations, on the
transparency and accountability of Spanish professional football clubs, and examines the influence of
financial performance on the transparency of Spanish football clubs. The study uses a Panel Data
methodology (FGLS) to compare the international transparency index for football clubs (INFUT)
with the criteria of UEFA’s FFP as a measure of the social and financial performance, respectively,
on a sample of 28 Spanish professional teams of first and second division during the periods of
2015, 2016, and 2019. The study reveals that the implementation of TL 19/2013 and UEFA’s FFP has
improved the transparency and accountability of clubs. On the one hand, the TL has facilitated access
to financial information, and, on the other, the FFP regulations have contributed to improving the
balance and financial viability of the clubs. The study also reveals that financial performance directly
influences the transparency of clubs.
Keywords: transparency; accountability; financial performance; social performance; professional football
1. Introduction
A critical difference between sport and business organizations lies in the way they
measure performance [1]. The main aim of business organizations is to make a profit, while
sport organizations measure performance based on sporting results [2–4].
Thus, the economic profits of a sport organization do not necessarily satisfy its stake-
holders if the expected sporting results are not achieved [5].A classic example is European
football clubs, in which maximizing performance on the playing field permeates the club’s
management logic [6].
Over recent decades, the growth of the European football industry and its billion-euro
turnover has attracted the interest of major investors, global media and sponsors [6–8].
Various studies confirm that European football clubs often report losses and debts [7,9–12].
Other studies reveal that even investors in European professional football clubs prioritize
sports performance over economic performance [13]. In this regard, Buraimo et al. [14]
demonstrate that even the most rigid stakeholders are surprisingly patient and tolerant
regarding overdrafts and unpaid bills. For fear of the disapproval of the community, banks,
investors, creditors, and tax authorities are almost always reluctant to apply strict policies
in football clubs to avoid confrontation with fans [15]. Therefore, with the consent of their
stakeholders, many clubs continue their operations, despite being bankrupt [6]. This fact
urged UEFA regulators to introduce the Financial Fair Play regulation, the scope of which
was to introduce more discipline and rationality of clubs’ finances and generally to protect
the long-term viability of European football clubs [16]. (p. 496). In this sense, Nicoliello and
Zampatti [17] point out that the FFP can be considered as the first regulation of European
football that tries to transform the traditional approach of “utility maximization” (UM), in
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which victories are prioritized in a “profit maximization” (PM) most common approach
in the Anglo-Saxon world. In this regard, Wilson et al. [18] found that PM-oriented clubs
have better financial health when compared to UM-oriented clubs, and they were more
likely to comply with FFP regulations.
In Spain, the tendency to prioritize victories on the field of play (UM) over the
Anglo-Saxon model (PM) has been noted. In the early 21st century, Spanish football has
reached its competitive peak, claiming two Euro Cups (2008 and 2012) and the 2010 World
Championship. The world’s greatest footballers play in the Spanish League, and Spanish
clubs often occupy the top positions in European competitions and UEFA’s coefficient
ranking, as well as ranking among UEFA’s highest-earning teams [19]. For instance, Real
Madrid featured first place in the Money League after generating a record revenue of over
€750 m in 2017/18 [20].
However, the situation is very different when it comes to accountability. Over the first
decade of the 21st century, Spanish football has accumulated debts and losses to the point
that the sustainability of the current business model has been questioned; some clubs have
seriously struggled to pay their players, staff, and suppliers, as well as their taxes [21,22].
With this brief description of what the sporting and financial performance of Spanish
football has been, we can show the predominance of the UM model characteristic of
continental Europe open leagues, and which has already been observed in other leagues
in the region, such as the Italian [17]. This structure contrasts with the North American
closed leagues in which a PM model predominates. Another distinctive feature can be
observed in the previous history and structures of the leagues. For example, English
football clubs adopted the status of Sports Corporations (SADs) before the First World
War [23], while, in Spain, it is only with Sports Law of 1990 and Royal Decree 1084 of 15 July
1991, which the Spanish Government compelled all professional football clubs with losses
to become SADs. Only four clubs in the top two tiers did not become SAD: Athletic de
Bilbao, Barcelona, Atlético Osasuna, and Real Madrid. The remaining clubs became SADs
at the end of the 1991/92 season [24]. Another difference is the listing on the stock market.
While English clubs have been registered since 1983, in Spain, there are no Professional
Football League (Liga de Fútbol Profesional (LFP)) clubs to date that have been listed on
the Stock Exchange [25], which also allows for less transparency and accountability. In fact,
the richest clubs are not Sports Corporations, but Sports Associations (for example: Real
Madrid and Barcelona).
With the implementation of the FFP regulations, the literature has focused on assessing
the impact of the new regulation on the economic and financial balance [17], the sport’s
balance [26], or both [27,28]. In this regard, the FFP has not been designed to address
the issue of competitive equilibrium [29], as it only limits an individual club’s spending
relative to its resources [30]. Therefore, this study addresses the financial aspect of the new
regulations in Spanish football, the impact of which has been positive compared to other
leagues [31].
However, there is a social dimension that becomes more relevant every day in response
to the growing demands of stakeholders, and that has not been addressed in-depth due to
the complexity of establishing variables capable of measuring these social aspects.
Given the importance of financial information as a measure of transparency, the
implementation of Transparency Law (TL) 19/2013 [32] is presented as an attempt to
regulate how sport resources are managed and guarantee public access to institutional
and economic information pertaining to first- and second-tier clubs that are recipients of
public funds, with the purpose of improving communication and accountability. Addition-
ally, Transparency International Spain (TIE) has prepared an international transparency
index for football clubs (INFUT), and, given the relevance attributed to transparency by
UEFA’s FFP [33] and Spanish football Economic Control Regulation (Reglamento de Con-
trol Económico (RCE)) [34], it is appropriate to assess the behavior of clubs towards society
through their transparency. In this context, the objective of this study is to contrast the
influence of financial performance on the transparency of Spanish football clubs.
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Thus, the article is organized as follows: after the introduction, Section 2 provides an
overview of the theoretical framework and of the link between transparency and financial
sustainability in Spanish professional football within the current regulatory framework,
before presenting our research hypotheses. The methodology used and the empirical
analysis are described in Section 3, and the results are shown in Section 4. Section 5
presents the main findings and discusses some of their implications. Section 6 presents
the conclusions.
2. Previous Literature
2.1. Transparency and Social Performance in Professional Spanish Football
Transparency has been defined as ‘clarity in procedures and decision-making, particu-
larly in resources allocation’ [35] (p. 31). In the field of sports governance, transparency
is becoming increasingly important, and it is the most frequently cited principle in good
governance codes for national and international sports organizations [36], as well as being
regarded as one of the main tools for evaluating the governance of sports organizations [37].
Two other concepts are often mentioned in the literature in association with trans-
parency: disclosure and accountability. It should be noted that transparency is chiefly
understood as a communication process that involves both the availability of information
and active participation in the acquisition, creation, and distribution of knowledge [38].
Disclosure is understood as the act of making information about an organization available,
either voluntarily or as a result of a legal requirement. In some cases, disclosure and trans-
parency are used interchangeably or in combination [39], but ‘just giving information does
not constitute transparency’ [40] (p. 74). While a certain level of disclosure is necessary
to guarantee transparency, disclosure alone is not sufficient to ensure high standards of
transparency, for disclosure can decrease transparency if an excess of information is used
to disguise important facts [41].
On the other hand, Spanish clubs going into administration, tax defaults, and lack
of transparency have projected a bad image of the sports sector, a loss of reputation, and
understandable public suspicion [42]. In this regard, the implementation of TL 19/2013,
is presented as a regulatory action on the part of the state to alleviate public distrust
by facilitating public access to institutional and economic information [32] pertaining to
first- and second-tier clubs that receive public financial support, and by strengthening
communication channels and accountability.
In Spain, Transparency International (TI) has developed a specific transparency index
for football clubs (INFUT). This index comprises 60 indicators divided into five (5) areas of
transparency that include information about the club (INCLUB), relations with members,
fans and the general public (INSOC), economic-financial transparency (INEF), transparency
in contracts and supplies (INCS), and, finally, the indicators set out in TL 19/2013 (INT) [43].
The report of the third edition of INFUT in 2019 reflects that the number of clubs that
manage to be 100% transparent increased from 4.88% in the first two editions to 45.24% in
the third edition. In the same way, the clubs that achieve an efficiency greater than 80%
increased from 7.32% in 2015 to 26.83% in 2016, reaching up to 90.48% of the clubs in 2019.
Additionally, for 2015, 58.54% of the clubs were below 50% transparency. This proportion
was reduced to 26.83% in the second edition, and dropping to 0% in the third edition [43].
INFUT suggests that, on average, club transparency increased from 44.21% in 2015 to
62.81% in 2016 and, finally, to 93.63% in 2019. For greater detail, Table 1 presents the descrip-
tive statistics of the 5 transparency areas outlined in TIE’s reports by year [43]. As shown,
the economic-financial and contracts and supplies areas yield the lowest results. This is
consistent with Pielke’s [8] results, which suggest that, among Grant and Keohane’s [44]
seven mechanisms of accountability, the interaction between fiscal accountability and legal
accountability is the most important in the football industry. Therefore, it seems reasonable
that both UEFA’s FFP and the Spanish LPF’s RCE focus on these aspects.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for transparency areas.
Min Max Mean Std. Dev.
2015 2016 2019 2015 2016 2019 2015 2016 2019 2015 2016 2019
INFUT 10.00 15.80 53.13 100.00 100.00 100.00 44.21 62.81 93.63 23.23 23.39 10.68
INCLUB 22.20 16.70 65.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 51.21 75.73 94.17 23.04 23.29 9.17
INSOC 16.70 30.60 64.29 100.00 100.00 100.00 51.34 74.11 96.68 22.91 21.89 6.94
INEF 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 34.24 49.64 90.60 30.60 33.84 22.64
INCS 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 22.44 40.73 87.62 28.00 33.94 24.18
INT 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 52.10 64.30 94.18 27.86 24.65 16.87
INFUT: General transparency index for football clubs, INCLUB: information about the club sub-index, INSOC: relations with members,
fans and the general public sub-index, INEF: economic-financial transparency sub-index, INCS: transparency in contracts and supplies
sub-index, INT: indicators set out in TL 19/2013 sub-index.
The difficulty of measuring the vigor of the social management of sports organiza-
tions in continental Europe concerning Anglo-Saxon environments is a consequence of
the marked differences between both sports systems when communicating their social
responsibility strategies. While, in some European countries, these actions are expressed
implicitly, in Anglo-Saxon countries, it is explicit [45]. In this sense, given the importance
that the regulation attributes to transparency, the INFUT is presented as a proxy variable
for club’s social performance.
2.2. Accountability and Financial Performance in Professional Football
When information concerning the actions of organizations is released, there is always
overlap in the use of the term accountability and transparency. The literature reveals
that accountability is a broader concept, in how organizations are held responsible for
their actions [46], while transparency focuses on providing accurate, understandable, and
accessible information to stakeholders [37].
In this context, the persistent behavior of professional football teams to consider
sporting results above profit [2–4] often leads to financial hardship [7,9–12].
To guarantee the financial viability of clubs, the governing body, UEFA, issued the
FFP in 2010. UEFA controls the financial status and performance of clubs based on ac-
counting data. Clubs are expected to present ‘break-even results’ (equal revenue and
expenses [33,47,48]. Clubs that fail to meet these standards face strict penalties, such as
fines or disqualification from the European club competitions [49]. Moreover, the inability
to meet the financial thresholds set by the FFP also leads to a loss of income, putting the
financial viability of most clubs at risk. Deloitte’s reports [10] expect that the advent of the
FFP is to lead to a change in philosophy in many clubs, prompting them to adopt more
balanced management practices [33].
In Spain, Sánchez et al. [50] point out that the Sports Law enacted in 1990 already
gave the LFP the power to supervise the finances of professional clubs. In line with FFP
regulations, in 2014, the LFP introduced additional financial controls that resulted in more
rigorous supervision, both concerning previous seasons (a posteriori) and budgets for
future seasons (a priori) Economic Control Regulation (RCE) of Sports Associations ((Aso-
ciaciones Deportivas (ADs)) and Sports Public Limited Companies (Sociedades Anónimas
Deportivas (SADs)), affiliated with the Spanish LFP. The general aim of these regulations is
‘to promote the solvency of ADs and SADs’ [34]. In addition, these regulations also aim ‘to
increase the economic and financial capacity of clubs as well as their transparency’ [34].
However, some studies suggest that this regulatory effort may not be having the
intended results, reducing, rather than increasing, the transparency and credibility of
clubs’ managers, since the imposition of regulatory control linked to reporting based on
accounting data can lead to a deterioration in accounting quality [15], to a discretionary
choice of the audit firm [51], and an increase in auditing fees [25].
However, the financial reports of the Higher Sports Council of Spain (Consejo Superior
de Deportes (CSD)) [52] present evidence of the improvements in the financial situation
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of Spanish football as a consequence of the new regulations. Mareque et al. [25] observe
improvements in the financial performance of the clubs, and Ahtiainen and Jarva [31]
highlight the positive impact of the regulations on Spanish football compared to other
European leagues. This behavior is related to that observed in other sectors of Spanish
sport in response to new financial regulations [53].
On average, revenues and expenses increase, but the latter to a lesser degree, and
this has contributed to improving their earnings, which meets the expectations of the
UEFA regulations by seeking that clubs present ‘break-even results’ (equal revenues and
expenses) [33,47,48]. Figure 1 shows the behavior of the revenues and expenses of the
Spanish first division during the last 20 years.
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As can be seen, revenues and expenses are balanced just at the time the new regulations
are implemented, and benefits begin to be observed.
2.3. Social Performance vs. Financial Performance in Spanish Professional Football
At present, research on football clubs has only been approached from a financial
and sports perspective. However, there is also a social dimension of public relevance for
professional footbal clubs that are gaining importance, which makes the contrast between
transparency and accountability of football clubs in response to TL 19/2013 and UEFA’s
FFP (as measures of social and financial performance, respectively) require a theoretical
framework on which to base the analyses.
In this regard, the relationship between social performance and financial performance
has been considered in theoretical and empirical studies, in which a theoretical frame-
work [54] arises as a response to the skepticism of the neoclassical argument subscribed to
the utility paradigm, according to which companies have only one social responsibility:
to increase their profits [55]. In sports, this objective is replaced by obtaining competitive
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results. Such is the case of professional football, where these two management models, UM
and PM, come into the debate.
The theoretical frameworks that have emerged in subsequent decades are determined
by the sign (positive, negative or neutral) and the causal sequence of the relationship,
according to which social actions can be contrasted as an independent, dependent variable,
or that there is a synergistic link [56]. All these possible theoretical relationships have been
worked with a linear model, which is summarized in Table 2.
Table 2. Typologies of the relationship between SP and FP.
CAUSAL SEQUENCE
SIGN OF THE RELATIONSHIP
Positive Neutral Negative




FP→SP Hypothesis of the availabilityof funds
Hypothesis of opportunism
of managers
SP↔ FP Positive synergy Negative synergy
Source: Preston and O’Bannon [56].
To contrast the previous relationships, among the empirical studies that try to confirm
the sign of the relationship and the causal sequence between these variables, the multivari-
ate analyses that examine the links between different measures of the social and financial
variables are highlighted, incorporating the influence of moderating factors, such as the
size of the company, sector, I + D + i, etc. [57].
Through the use of the predominant ordinary least squares methodology in the
literature, the most common model is reduced to the following expressions:
SP = α + βFP + δCV + ε, (1)
FP = α + βSP + δCV + ε, (2)
where social performance SP will be the dependent variable, the financial performance
FP the independent variable (1), or vice versa (2); CV represents the control variables that
would moderate the SP-FP relationship, or vice versa; and ε is the error term.
When reviewing the empirical research [57–59], the trade-off hypothesis seems to
be rejected in favor of the social impact hypothesis; in the same way, the hypothesis
of the opportunism of managers is displaced by the hypothesis of the availability of
funds, indirectly rejecting the hypothesis of negative synergy (see Table 2). There is
little contribution to the hypothesis of positive synergy since few studies consider the
relationship between Social and Financial Performance in both directions.
Some studies have contrasted the SP-FP binomial on European samples [60] and
Spanish samples [61]. However, most of the studies are based on American or English
companies, which makes it necessary to research European companies, in general, and
Spanish companies, in particular [57–62]. In addition, the usual has been cross-sectional
studies located in different industries, having greater consistency if they focused on a
specific sector [63]. In this regard, only the study by Inoue, Kent and Lee [64] stands out,
who focused on sports, analyzing the main professional leagues in the United States, with
the limitation of “mixing” different sports. All this justifies that this study is framed in the
Spanish context and a specific sector: professional football.
2.4. Formulation of Hypotheses
In the framework of the hypothesis of the availability of funds [56], the present study
contrasts the influence of financial performance on the transparency of Spanish football
clubs. For this, a set of specific hypotheses could confirm in greater detail the behavior of
the SP-FP relationship.
Generally, financial performance is measured with ratios, such as financial profitabil-
ity (Return on Equity- ROE) and, less often, economic profitability (Return on Asset-
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ROA). However, in the football industry, the number of clubs that usually report neg-
ative net worth undermines comparisons between clubs, making this ratio somewhat
meaningless [65]. For this reason, since the denominator in ROA represents the value of
the club’s total assets that never assume negative values, the specialized literature has
tended to use ROA to measure the performance of Spanish [21,25], and European, football
clubs [15,16,51,65,66].
Since regulators seek ‘to improve the economic and financial capacity of the clubs,
increasing their transparency and credibility’ [33,34], our first hypothesis is formulated
as follows.
Hypothesis 1 (H1). ROA is directly associated with the levels of transparency in football clubs.
According to Dimitropoulos and Tsagkanos [66], European football clubs seem to be
more win maximizers than profit maximizers and are willing to resolve on debt financing
and sustain severe losses for enhancing their on-field performance. Therefore, we believe
that leverage (as measured by the ratio of total debt to common equity) will have a negative
relation with transparency and the tendency to report small positive income, formulating
our second hypothesis as follows.
Hypothesis 2 (H2). Leverage is negatively associated with the levels of transparency in foot-
ball clubs.
On the other hand, Kelly [67] points out that in the football industry the manager’s
target is to win championships, avoid relegations, and remain solvent. In this regard, some
studies show that clubs prioritize solvency over profitability [68], perhaps, intending to
change possible mimetic isomorphisms that have become institutionalized in the sector,
such as increasing debts and persistent deficits [7,9–12], which have led popular clubs to
the brink of bankruptcy [6].
In addition to this, solvency is a priority criterion for sport governing bodies and
the reason why internal regulations of some European Leagues, such as Spanish LFP [34],
or the Direction Nationale du Contrôle de Gestion (DNCG) French [69], give priority to
solvency over other financial ratios when it comes to allocating resources. For these reasons,
our third hypothesis is formulated as follows.
Hypothesis 3 (H3). Solvency is positively associated with the levels of transparency in foot-
ball clubs.
In addition, we consider that the behavior of the clubs towards their creditors should
be valued both in the long term and in the short term. This fact leads us to the need to
confirm whether the liquidity of the clubs is a determinant of transparency and, along the
same lines, to establish our fourth hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4 (H4). Liquidity is positively associated with the levels of transparency in foot-
ball clubs.
Dependence on a single source of income has an impact on accountability, compro-
mising the financial sustainability of clubs. Such is the case of clubs that are overly reliant
on broadcasting rights, a widespread phenomenon in European football [50]. We believe
that these clubs can even compromise their transparency to meet the conditions set by
UEFA, LFP, and other regulatory bodies and guarantee their main source of income since
the dependence on resources usually leads to acting coercively [53]. Because clubs are
demonstrably prone to commit beyond their means, the regulations demand that they
‘operate according to income’ [34]. We believe that adequate segregation of income would
help to mitigate these risks. For this reason, our fifth hypothesis is formulated as follows.
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Hypothesis 5 (H5). Income concentration is indirectly associated with the level of transparency of
football clubs.
Regarding our control variables, according to Orlitzky [70], the size of companies is
positively related to business performance and viability because it can lead to economies
of scale and greater control of resources by stakeholders. Additionally, the potential for
regulatory scrutiny increases as companies become larger and more profitable [71,72].
There are previous studies on clubs from major European professional football leagues that
confirm this behavior [15], and others that reject it [69], so this relationship is not clear in
the football industry.
On the other hand, the results of Transparency International highlights that ‘trans-
parency is a matter of will or attitude, rather than of economic size or budget capacity’;
in 2015, the two most transparent first-tier clubs were at the opposite ends of the budget
bracket (Real Madrid: € 578 million; Eibar: € 16 million), and the four most transparent
clubs in 2016 were relatively small in terms of economic size [43], behavior that is replicated
for 2019. In the framework of these contradictory statements, we have formulated our sixth
hypothesis as follows.
Hypothesis 6 (H6). Size is positively associated with the levels of transparency in football clubs.
Finally, the need arises to consider whether the observed changes attend to a maturing
process of football clubs as a consequence of the new regulations. For this reason, we have
formulated our seventh and last hypothesis.
Hypothesis 7 (H7). Time is positively associated with the levels of transparency in football clubs.
As a whole, the proposed hypotheses will allow us to contrast whether financial
performance has an impact on the transparency of the clubs and, with it, the traditional
hypothesis of the availability of funds.
3. Materials and Methods
3.1. Sample and Data
The sample initially comprised the 42 clubs in the top two Spanish professional football
leagues; clubs that did not provide full financial reports or transparency indexes for the
period under study (2015, 2016, and 2019) or that were relegated to the third tier in any of
these two seasons were excluded. Finally, we have obtained a balanced panel of 28 clubs
(n = 28), of which four (4) are Ads, and the remaining (24) SADs, during the 3 seasons
(t = 3) in which TIE published its INFUT indexes (2014–2015, 2015–2016, 2018–2019), for
a total of 84 observations. The financial data has been extracted from the Iberian Balance
Analysis System database (SABI) and the transparency portals on the club’s websites.
3.2. Empirical Analysis
In order to assess whether the performance and financial sustainability of football
clubs positively influence transparency, and to test our research hypotheses, we have
incorporated transparency as a dependent variable in the following model:
INFUTit = α0 + α1ROAit + α2LEVit + α3SOLVit + α4LIQit + α5HIit-1 + α6SIZEit + α7TIMEit + ε, (3)
where the INFUTit variable represents the Transparency Index of Football Clubs prepared
by TIE.
McGuire et al. [73] argue that accounting data, and especially ROA, are generally
better indicators of financial performance than measures based on market values, such as
the Altman’s Z-score or Tobin’s Q, which must be ruled out because no Spanish football
club is listed on the stock market. Therefore, following previous studies [21,25], we have
used ROA (represented by operating income before taxes and interest divided by total
assets) to test our first hypothesis (H1).
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Given that one of the objectives of the FFP is to reduce debt, the variable leverage
(LEVit) measured by the ratio of total debt to common equity contrasts our (H2) based on
the percentage of external financing of the teams, since the clubs more leveraged will be
further from complying with the regulations, and, consequently, they will seek to be less
transparency so as not to be sanctioned.
Since the general objective of the LFP’s RCE (a posteriori) is to promote the solvency
of ADs and SADs [34], the SOLVit solvency ratio has been used (ratio of total assets over
total liabilities), as well as liquidity (ratio of current assets to current liabilities), to test our
third (H3) and fourth (H4) hypotheses. These ratios measure long- and short-term business
viability based on strict book values and, in turn, allow comparisons between clubs of
different sizes. Dimitropoulos and Tsagkanos [66] used both accounting measures, financial
performance (ROAit) and business viability (SOLVit), in their analysis of the European
football sector.
To test our fifth hypothesis (H5), the HIit variable was considered as an expression
of the Herfindahl index (H Index). This indicator is used in different areas as a measure
of concentration; therefore, it allows us to assess income concentration, as well as clubs’
degree of financial dependence on specific sources of income. The H index is the sum of the
squares of the percentage of total income represented by each of the top four main sources
of relevant revenues, according to the UEFA’s FFP [33]: Broadcasting rights, sponsorship
and advertising, gate receipts, and commercial activities, according to the club’s financial






where H represents the H Index, i the four (4) main sources of income, and pi the percentage
of each club’s income represented by the source of income i. In this occasion, the H Index
will oscillate between 0.25 and 1; H = 1 indicates maximum income concentration, Hand
0.25 maximum income dispersion.
The H Index represents a proportion of an accounting item of a nominal nature, such
as income (unlike the rest of the financial variables described so far, which are based on
accounting ratios over real items). In this sense, because the regulations demand that
they ‘operate according to income’ [34], it is logical to expect that the application of said
income will be reflected in the following season. In this regard, Birkhäuser, Kaserer, and
Urban [74] present evidence that, after the introduction of FFP, former season’s winners are
correlated with greater budget shares in the upcoming season. Based on these arguments,
we consider it appropriate to incorporate a lagged effect in the H Index variable considering
the previous year, as in preceding studies [31].
Additionally, the model incorporates two control variables. First, to test our sixth
hypothesis (H6), model (1) considers the size (SIZEit) of clubs, a variable that has proven
to be an important factor concerning the quality of accounting in previous research in the
sports field [15,16]. We shall use the natural logarithm of total assets (LnTA) at the end of
the fiscal year as a proxy variable (SIZEit) for club size, a widespread method to normalize
potentially biased values in financial studies [53]. In this regard, larger clubs are expected
to be more transparent, as the effect of regulatory scrutiny increases as companies become
larger [71,72], although INFUT 2015 and 2016 claim the opposite [43]. No sign can be
inferred for the coefficients of H4, owing to the contradictory empirical evidence discussed
in the previous section.
Second, to test our fifth and last hypothesis (H7), we have considered adding to the
model the variable TIMEit, with which it is intended to capture the temporal effect of the
learning process and adaptation to the new measures. Table 3 presents the relationship
between regulatory frameworks and the respective variables and indicators.
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Table 3. Operationalization of the variables.
Regulatory Framework Performance Variables Indicators
TL 19/2013 Social Performance Transparency Index INFUT
UEFA’s FFP/LFP’s RCE Financial Performance Accountability ROA/Leverage/Solvency/Liquidity/Herfindahl Index
Source: Author’s elaboration.
4. Results
Model (3) has been operationalized from a balanced panel of 28 clubs (n = 28) during
the 3 seasons (t = 3) in which TIE has published its INFUT indices (2014–2015, 2015–2016,
2018–2019), for a total of 84 observations. The model was also tested using the Doornik-
Hansen normality test [75]. The findings indicate that all the residuals in the model have a
normal distribution, with a significance level of 1%.
When observing the descriptive statistics (2015–2016–2019) for Equation (3), we see
that, on average, the transparency of the clubs is 70.44%. For the financial variables in
Table 4, we observe some stability in the ROA > 5% variable. However, the minimum
values suggest that a significant number of clubs has low profitability. This same situation
can be observed in leverage (>1) and solvency (>1.5), which, on average, seem stable, but
the wide gap between minimum and maximum values shows a significant imbalance in the
financial balance of the clubs. On average, liquidity presents a low capacity of the clubs to
honor their commitments in the short term (<1.5). On the other hand, the H Index suggests
a moderate concentration, the average being 0.475. All of this highlights the efforts made
by clubs to find alternative sources of revenue, possibly as a result of the need to comply
with the FFP’s break-even rules.
Table 4. Descriptive statistics (2015–2016–2019) for Equation (3).
Variable Min Max Mean Std. Dev.
INFUT 10.000 100.000 70.436 28.594
ROA −35.276 45.625 6.884 13.945
LEV −26.344 22.703 2.816 6.697
SOLV 0.222 8.361 1.749 1.378
LIQ 0.057 6.761 0.977 0.984
INDICE H t-1 0.253 1.000 0.475 0.176
LOG ACT 15.291 21.030 18.018 1.380
TIME 1.000 3.000 2.000 0.821
Source: Author’s elaboration.
In the periods analyzed, the correlation between the variables in Equation (3) suggests
that the transparency of the clubs increases over time and that the larger clubs are more
leveraged, less solvent, have less liquidity, and of a lower concentration of income. It also
seems that solvency and liquidity are related to each other, and both to the income con-
centration of the clubs. However, the variance-inflation factor test indicates the absence
of collinearity (vif < 10), therefore that none of these correlations is particularly strong.
Table 5 shows globally the correlations between the analyzed periods:
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Table 5. Pearson Correlation matrix (2015–2016–2019) variables in Equation (3).
Variables INFUT ROA LEV SOLV LIQ IH t-1 SIZE TIME
INFUT 1
ROA 0.135 1
LEV −0.068 −0.057 1
SOLV 0.179 −0.048 −0.123 1
LIQ 0.155 −0.09 −0.127 0.728 1
IH t-1 −0.029 −0.144 −0.101 0.276 0.416 1
SIZE 0.153 −0.035 0.31 −0.321 −0.302 −0.295 1
TIME 0.725 −0.023 0.007 0.09 0.113 0.076 0.143 1
Note: Values in bold are different from 0, with alpha significance level = 0.05.
First, traditional OLS techniques (OLS) with random effects and fixed effects are
evaluated. To discriminate between these two models, a Hausman test was performed,
which yielded a Chi-square = 3.47, corresponding to a p-value = 0.7480, which would be
recommending the estimates of random effects, something that is also consistent with the
data structure of the sample (N > T). However, as can be seen in Model 1 of Table 6, the
results obtained are not entirely favorable. Therefore, it is necessary to verify some possible
problems, such as cross-sectional dependence and heteroscedasticity. First, we have ruled
out cross-sectional dependence problems using the Pesaran [76] test by obtaining a statistic
of 1.087 and a p-value = 0.2772. To verify heteroskedasticity, we perform the Breusch-Pagan
and Cook-Weisberg test [77] for heteroskedasticity in a linear regression model, the results
of which indicate a heteroskedasticity problem (chi2 = 8.91 and Prob > chi2 = 0.0028).





Coefficient z Significance Coefficient z Significance
ROAit 0.3182122 2.01 0.044 ** 0.361393 7.59 0.000 ***
LEVit −0.3610613 −1.09 0.275 −0.485518 −3.49 0.000 ***
SOLVit 3.513109 1.47 0.142 2.755744 3.69 0.000 ***
LIQit 0.0089839 0.00 0.998 2.173572 2.03 0.043 **
IHit-1 −10.72099 −0.79 0.428 −16.40291 −4.42 0.000 ***
SIZEit 2.519967 1.25 0.213 2.160404 2.77 0.006 **
TIMEit 24.43574 10.23 0.000 *** 24.03663 21.65 0.000 ***
Constant −26.06973 −0.69 0.493 −17.98682 −1.43 0.152
R-sq = 0.5869 Time periods = 3
Number Observations = 84 Number Observations = 84
Number of groups = 28 Number of groups = 28
Note: (***), (**) indicate statistically significant coefficients at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively.
Faced with this situation, the Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) model
presents a solution to this problem, which is why it has been the selected model (Model 2)
to perform the estimates of Equation (3), and whose results are those that we finally present
in Table 6.
When the impact of financial performance on transparency is analyzed, the first thing
that stands out is a positive and statistically significant relationship (p = 0.000 ***) between
ROA and transparency. This suggests that more profitable clubs be more transparent. In this
sense, our first hypothesis is accepted (H1). Regarding Leverage, a negative and statistically
significant coefficient (p = 0.000 ***) is observed, confirming our fourth hypothesis (H2),
according to which the most leveraged clubs are less transparent.
Additionally, the results show a positive and statistically significant relationship
between transparency and the ability of clubs to honor their commitments in the short
term (LIQ p = 0.043 **) and long term (SOLV p = 0.000 ***), which confirms our second
Sustainability 2021, 13, 8663 12 of 16
(H3) and third hypotheses (H4). This result shows that the transparency of football clubs is
conditioned by their financial sustainability.
Regarding the relationship with the H Index, the results show a negative and statisti-
cally significant relation (p = 0.000 ***), confirming our fifth hypothesis (H5), according to
which the clubs with the highest concentration of income are expected to be less transparent,
and vice versa.
When observing the control variables of TIME and SIZE, the results confirm, in the first
place, a positive effect of time on transparency, which, in turn, justifies the heteroscedasticity
observed in the 1 OLS model. Finally, concerning size, the sign of the coefficient determines
that the largest clubs (SIZEit) would be more transparent. The results are statistically
significant for both cases, (TIME p = 0.000 *** and SIZE p = 0.006 **), which leads us to
accept the sixth (H6) and seventh (H7) hypotheses.
The general results confirm that the financial performance of the clubs influences
transparency and, with it, the hypothesis of the availability of funds [56].
5. Discussion
The study contributes to regulators a look at the impact of TL 19/2013 and UEFA’s FFP
regulations on the transparency and accountability of Spanish professional football clubs.
Second, a set of specific hypotheses has allowed us to test whether financial performance
affects the transparency of clubs and, with it, the traditional hypothesis of availability of
funds [56].
In this sense, the study contributes a European vision to the traditionally English-
speaking countries approach predominant in the specialized literature that contrasts Social
and Financial Performance [57,62]. This fact attributes a relevance to the present study,
given the marked differences between Anglo-Saxon law and continental European law
when assessing the impact of introducing new regulations in sport. On the other hand, by
focusing on professional football and analyzing different periods, a different perspective is
offered than the usual cross-sectional studies that contrast social and financial performance
on samples from different industries [63] or between various sports [64].
An additional contribution of this study has been the incorporation of an ad hoc index
for Spanish professional football clubs (INFUT), which manages to group 60 indicators
in 5 areas of transparency as a robust measure of social performance that overcomes the
limitations observed in previous studies [64]. On the other hand, accountability determines
financial performance based on UEFA’s financial fair play criteria and the LFP’s RCE. As
such, following Dimitropoulos and Tsagkanos [66], we have used economic profitability
(ROA) and solvency values to measure the clubs ’financial performance and business
viability. Leverage (LEV) and liquidity (LIQ) are also added as measures of financial
sustainability and short-term viability. H Index provides a measure of club sustainability
based on the segregation of income variable. Additionally, two control variables are
incorporated: the natural logarithm of total assets (LnTA) at the end of the fiscal year as a
proxy variable (SIZEit) for club size; and variable (TIMEit), to capture the temporal effect
of the learning process and adaptation to the new measures.
The impact of FFP regulations has translated into improvements in the financial bal-
ance of clubs ‘to operate based on their own revenues’ [33], and ‘to encourage responsible
spending’ [33], and transparency has improved as a consequence of the implementation
of TL 19/2013. Therefore, unlike Blavoukos et al. [78] and Dimitropoulos et al. [15], we
argue that there are no substantial differences between the regulations ’intended’ and
actual outcomes.
The empirical analysis suggests that ROA has a positive impact on club transparency,
while the more leveraged clubs with higher income concentrations are less transparent. Ad-
ditionally, the transparency of football clubs is conditioned on their financial sustainability
in the short (LIQ) and long term (SOLV). This fact is of special relevance if we consider that
the main purpose of FFP regulations, and especially with the LFP’s RCE, is ‘to promote
the solvency of clubs’ [34]. Consequently, the general results confirm the hypothesis of the
Sustainability 2021, 13, 8663 13 of 16
availability of funds [56], according to which the financial performances of clubs influence
social performance and, therefore, transparency. This fact is of special relevance since one
of the LFP’s RCE’s specific aims is to ‘improve the economic and financial capacity of clubs,
increasing their transparency and credibility’ [33,34].
The control’ variable size (SIZEit), is positively related to transparency (INFUT). As
such, our results confirm previous studies [15], which suggest that larger clubs are more
sensitive to regulatory scrutiny [71,72], and they contradict the statement of TIE [43], that
they are unrelated variables. The other control variable (TIMEit), manages to capture the
gradual effect of the learning process and adaptation to the new measures.
This study adds a quantitative dimension to the traditional qualitative approaches to
the analysis of institutional change in sports management [79]. In this regard, we argue
that the processes observed have the potential to change the existing institutional logic that
prioritizes sporting success over financial performance [2–4], thus contributing to a more
transparent and rational approach to decision-making processes that directly concern the
sustainability of clubs.
6. Conclusions
This study has examined the possible association between transparency and financial
sustainability in Spanish professional football clubs. INFUT has been used as a measure
of transparency and social performance, and UEFA’s FFP and the LFP’s RCE criteria as
a measure of accountability and financial performance. The transparency and financial
improvement suggest that clubs are sensitive to environmental regulations.
One of the main contributions of this study is the identification of a positive rela-
tionship between financial performance and transparency in Spanish football clubs. This
result suggests that the implementation of TL 19/2013 and UEFA’s FFP could generate a
virtuous circle with the potential to change clubs’ management logic in situations that can
compromise their financial sustainability.
However, although both regulations were implemented simultaneously, some of their
intended outcomes are taking longer to crystallize than others. It seems that making clubs
transparent by providing information to stakeholders in an accurate, understandable, and
accessible way is easier than making them accountable for their actions. It seems reasonable
to think that the improvement of the club’s financial situation and their sustainability
is a long-term objective. Therefore, we shall need to continue observing future club
behavior in terms of the transparency-financial sustainability, especially considering that
FFP regulations are to be executed gradually, and that one of the limitations of this study is
that no information exists before the implementation of TL 19/2013, as well as gaps created
by TIE for the periods 2017 and 2018. Another limitation to the scope of this study is that
only clubs that participate in European competitions are subscribed to the FFP regulations.
Despite recent progress in disclosure and financial practices in Spanish professional
football, we believe that there is still a long way to go in terms of transparency and
accountability. In order to examine new developments, future studies should also use
qualitative methodologies to explain the isomorphism caused by environmental pressure.
Another aspect to consider is the impact of the new regulations on the quality of accounting
information on specific aspects, such as the transfer of players [80]. The relationship
of transparency with non-financial performance measures could also be assessed [81].
Finally, the importance of other social variables which are complementary to transparency
should be highlighted, such as the adoption of codes of ethics, good governance [82],
environmental management, donations, and activities aimed at the social inclusion of
minority or disadvantaged groups.
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